Back in 2015 I wrote an article about security at the Library of Congress. I am reposting the article here because it is relevant to the January 6, 2021, insurrection that took place at the U.S. Capitol.
Capitol Hill, 2018.
The Library of Congress is America’s national library. It also may be the only library in the United States where getting into one of its Capitol Hill buildings is a lot like trying to board an airplane. Security protocols that once emphasized preventing loss by theft now appear more focused on keeping weapons and bombs out.
Since Timothy McVeigh bombed the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995 and the 9/11 attacks, security at the Library and elsewhere in the federal ecosystem has been dialed up to high. Between 1995 and the aftermath of 9/11, streets in the federal core were closed and new gates, bollards, and industrial-sized planters protect building exteriors. Many Washingtonians believe that the city has been turned into an armed camp.
Security hardening goes beyond architecture
Inside federal buildings, there’s a hodgepodge of security measures that include metal detectors, searches, hand-held wands, and ID checks to get beyond lobbies and driveways. At the Library of Congress this means passing through metal detectors and, in recent years, removing laptop computers and tablets from briefcases and backpacks, to be screened by x-ray machines. A new twist to Library of Congress security is forcing visitors to remove their belts and send them through the x-ray if the metal detector sounds an alarm.
Capitol Hill security checkpoint, February 2015.
Longtime researchers who use the Library’s 158-million-item collection and Library staff have seen the security change from being focused on keeping things in to keeping things out. The most notable change in security protocols involves screenings on entry and leaving. When I began reporting this story, one colleague commented, “This needs to be written.”
Security changes reflect terrorism fears
A museum security website described the process for entering in 1998: “The procedure is no different than most other security stations on Capitol Hill: Hand the guard your bag and walk through the metal detectors.” That process typically took seconds to accomplish. Now, it takes on average two minutes to remove electronics and other items, place tem on the x-ray conveyor, pass through the metal detector, and reassemble things — and sometimes re-dress — on the other side.
Leaving the Library used to involve a Library of Congress Police officer removing everything from briefcases and backpacks and thumbing through books and papers to ensure that nothing was leaving that shouldn’t. That sometimes took a minute or two. Now, officers peek into partially opened bags and do not bother to inspect books and folders. And, they do this while sometimes talking to other officers in the screening stations. This process typically takes less than 10 seconds.
Did police force merger weaken security?
Longtime researchers and staff suggest that the apparent paradigm shift in Library security accelerated with the 2008 Library of Congress Police merger with the U.S. Capitol Police. The Library got its own police force in 1950. Congress authorized the Librarian of Congress to create one to protect the complex’s “buildings and grounds, and adjacent streets.” Part of the new force’s mission was to maintain decorum in the Library and to protect “persons and property therein.” That property includes all of the items in the Library’s collections.
Library of Congress Jefferson Building entrance with security barrier, February 2015. Federal regulations prohibit photographing interior security checkpoints.
In 1987, Congress passed a law restructuring the Library’s police force to make it comparable to the pay and rank structures in the Capitol Police. Reacting to the 9/11 attacks and the later anthrax “incidents,” the General Accounting Office in early 2002 first <a href=”http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/91352.pdf”>investigated</a> [PDF] merging the two police forces. The GAO reported favorably on merging the forces. The merger would eliminate redundancies and create efficiencies. “The LOC and USCP missions both include responsibilities for protecting visitors, congressional members and staff, and national treasures,” the GAO wrote. The merger became effective in 2008.
Most of the discussion around the time of the merger turned on personnel matters: seniority and rank. There does not appear to have been a public discussion about what the merger would mean for loss prevention at the Library of Congress. Inspector General <a href=”http://www.loc.gov/about/office-of-the-inspector-general/annual-reports/”>reports</a> published semi-annually show that most security issues in the Library relate to employee theft and the theft of laptop computers.
Sensitive security protocols
Shennell Antrobus, an officer in the U.S. Capitol Police public information office, was unable to provide specifics about Library of Congress security screening. He described the information as “law-enforcement-sensitive” in a recent telephone interview.
“We have both entrance and exit searches. For the entry we want to make sure that no dangerous or prohibited items come in,” Antrobus said. “On the exit we want to make sure that things aren’t removed from the buildings.”
Antrobus declined to answer about changes in exit screening over the past decade, citing sensitivity. “We use our technology and certain aspects of security screening for both the entry and the exit,” he said.
From national treasures to eBay sales
Like most museums and archives, the Library uses multiple layers of security to protect its collections. Items are marked and labeled to prevent loss by theft. Private security guards monitor access points to all reading rooms and reading rooms for rare manuscripts and photos have additional security. And, there are cameras everywhere.
Library of Congress reading room
None of these appear to be fully effective in preventing researchers and staff from leaving with purloined items. In 2011, presidential historian Barry Landau and an accomplice were <a href=”http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2011/09/26/charged-historian-seeks-to-sell-assets/”>indicted</a> for stealing items from the Maryland Historical Society and other institutions, including the Library of Congress.
Other recent high-profile thefts from libraries and archives include two former National Archives employees. In 2011, former archivist Leslie Waffen was arrested for stealing historic recordings and selling them on eBay. Shaun Aubitz, an archivist in the National Archives Philadelphia branch, was convicted in 2002 for stealing items and selling them on eBay.
The National Archives thefts occurred despite tight security that involves guards examining every piece of paper and book leaving facilities.
National Archives at College Park, 2018.
Library security was tight long before terrorism reconfigured federal architecture and Washington’s landscapes. But does it make sense to retool security in federal facilities that require rigorous two-way screening so that only incoming people and packages are thoroughly screened? That seems to be what has happened at the Library of Congress.
© 2015-2021 D.S. Rotenstein
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